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warfare in World War II, aircraft carriers, and the Soviet impact on Arab armies (Soviet tanks were delivered, but
Soviet doctrine was not adopted). More
recent examples include the Soviet
approach to managing the Warsaw
Pact, the “special relationship” that
has existed since 1945 among Englishspeaking democracies, and the patterns
of nuclear proliferation and the spread
of information technology.
This work is directed to both the social
scientist and the policy practitioner.
The chapters are well written and rich
in detail, with excellent footnotes, thus
making this a handy volume for anyone
doing research in these areas.
There are times when the unifying
theme of the diffusion of “technology
and ideas” becomes so broad that it
seems to include everything militarily
that has happened or that is going to
happen, for what else is there to a strategic confrontation but the weapons
owned and how they will be used? Yet
this work brings the subject into
sharper focus, revealing how ideas
about the appropriate use of weapons
do not always travel as well as the weapons themselves. The introductory outline thus helps to maintain that focus,
and the concluding chapter by Emily
Goldman and Andrew Ross is extremely
valuable for sifting out the recurring
patterns that emerge from the evidence
presented.
Among the important conclusions
mentioned are that transformation
leaders do not long monopolize their
transformations; leaders are frequently
surpassed by followers; leadership effecting a military transformation is no
guarantee of victory; and wholesale replications of the innovations of a transformation may not be necessary. Most
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central to this work is the finding that
“software”(ideas and doctrine) does not
travel as well as “hardware” (physical
weapons). The explanation for this last
limitation is the basic theme of the entire book.
Collections of conference papers often
do not hang together well, or when they
do, they typically do not wander far
enough away from a simple theme. This
book suffers from neither drawback,
being rich and eclectic in the materials
it offers, yet at the same time remaining
focused on an important set of questions. It offers a great deal for anyone
concerned with the military-technology
revolution.
GEORGE H. QUESTER

University of Maryland

Record, Jeffrey. Making War, Thinking History.
Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2002.
216pp. $28.95

Jeffrey Record is professor of strategy
and international security at the Air
War College, Maxwell Air Force Base.
He is the author of four books and numerous monographs on U.S. military
strategy and has extensive Capitol Hill
experience, including service as a professional staffer for the Senate Armed
Services Committee.
This work assesses how the experiences
of Munich and Vietnam influenced
presidential decisions on the use of
force in every administration from
Harry Truman to Bill Clinton. Both
Munich and Vietnam are regularly invoked in current political debate in an
attempt to justify a viewpoint, especially since the Cold War foreign policy
consensus has broken down in recent
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years. The terms have become shorthand for “appeasement” and “quagmire.” Yet the real influence of these
two cases on presidential decision making about the use or nonuse of force
has been subtler, and has depended
considerably on the background of individual presidents and on the formative experiences they brought with
them into office.
For some presidents, historical analogy
was an explicit factor in their use of
force. After 1945, there was broad consensus that “Munich is about whether to
use force and about what can happen
when force is not used.” Thus Truman
based his 1950 decision to intervene in
Korea on what happened, or more precisely on what did not happen, in Munich, noting that a president “must
make the effort to apply this knowledge
[of history] to the decisions that have to
be made.” John F. Kennedy was heavily
influenced during the Cuban missile
crisis of 1962 by Barbara Tuchman’s
The Guns of August (1962). Munich
was a powerful factor in leading both
Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson into
Vietnam, on the basis of the imperative
to stop cross-border aggression.
Vietnam is a more complex matter. Indeed, thirty years after Vietnam, there is
still little agreement on the lessons from
that conflict. There are many arguments about how force should have
been used there, many implying that
the “right” use of force would have resulted in a U.S. victory, or at least not a
defeat. Others argue that Vietnam
“teaches that force should have never
been used in the first place, thus rendering moot discussions about the
amount of force necessary and how it
should have been employed.”
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Record traces the predominant postVietnam schools of thought that influence political discussion today. He
discusses major intellectual themes,
such as Caspar Weinberger’s six “tests”
for use of U.S. military force, later subsumed by Colin Powell’s principle that
“winning meant going in with overwhelming force, getting the job done
quickly, and getting out cleanly”—
though he notes wryly that the real
world is rarely that immaculate. Another policy discussed is the imperative
to avoid anything like Vietnam. Presidents have been more willing to cut
their losses in places like Lebanon and
Somalia. “On balance, post-Vietnam
presidents have displayed significantly
greater risk aversion, and especially sensitivity to incurring casualties, than
their predecessors. In this they have
been reinforced by an even more timid
Pentagon.”
The consequences have been great. Indeed, the lessons of Munich were the
basis for U.S. Gulf intervention in
1990–91. “The haste with which the
Bush administration terminated the
war . . . reflected a Vietnam-driven
dread of involvement in postwar Iraq.
This fear of getting sucked into a
bloody Arab quagmire drove the Bush
administration to end the war prematurely,” with all the dire consequences
that follow today. Similarly, “U.S. behavior before and during Operation
ALLIED FORCE [in Kosovo] constituted
the most dramatic display to date of the
Vietnam syndrome at work and its operational and political consequences for
American foreign policy.” Indeed,
Saddam was not wholly foolish to wonder whether the United States would really invade Iraq in March 2003.
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Moreover, the continuing differences
within administrations over what Vietnam means has been actively harmful
to American policy. The deeply hostile
relationship between George Shultz and
Caspar Weinberger, based on their differing views of the post-Vietnam use of
force as a tool of American foreign policy, damaged the Reagan administration. Similar ongoing antagonism
between Colin Powell and Donald
Rumsfeld has done considerable harm
to U.S. post–11 September strategy and
policy execution.
Record briefly ponders whether the
1991 Iraq war constitutes a third seminal case that could serve as a historical
marker, but then suggests not, because
it did not entail “bloody and soulsearing foreign policy disasters.” Yet it
suggests another key issue, namely the
recurrent American failure to tie in a
war’s military ending with political and
strategic objectives. Examples include
the abandonment of Europe in the aftermath of World War I; the failure to
take Berlin in April 1945, when doing
so might have forestalled some of what
was to come in the Cold War; and the
premature cease-fire ordered by George
H. W. Bush, which is not unconnected
with why we occupy Iraq today (which
in itself may yet become another
instance).
Reasoning by historical analogy has
many pitfalls. While analogy may be
helpful in making decision makers ask
the “right questions” in a current crisis,
“past employment and deployment of
the Munich and Vietnam analogies suggest that they can teach effectively at the
level of generality, but are insensitive to
differences in detail.” Whatever the
utility of reasoning by historical analogy as a tool of policy formation and
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implementation, it is clear that policy
makers will continue to be influenced
by past events and what they believe
those events teach. It is also clear that a
presidents’ (and key advisers’) knowledge of history varies widely and that
reasoning by historical analogy is but
one of a host of factors at play in presidential decision making, that “every
president’s knowledge of past events is
different and is subject to political
bias.” Perhaps the greatest actual effect
of historical analogy is how it frames
the worldviews of key protagonists, not
how it may lead to “the right answer” in
new situations.
The 2003 Iraq invasion and its aftermath make this book particularly interesting and topical. While the cases
discussed end in the 1990s, surely the
“lessons” of Munich and Vietnam (and
likely the first Gulf War) influenced the
post-9/11 views of President George W.
Bush and other key actors about how to
react to al-Qa’ida and what to do about
Iraq and Saddam and other perceived
threats. In fact, one of the reasons the
Bush administration has come under
such fierce criticism in the national security realm is that its decisions and actions are so counter to the general run
of post-Vietnam American policy, as described in Making War, Thinking History.
This book provides a good framework
for thinking about the vital security issues the United States faces today.
JAN VAN TOL

Captain, U.S. Navy

Wright, Evan. Generation Kill: Devil Dogs,
Iceman, Captain America, and the New Face of
American War. New York: Putnam, 2004. 354pp.
$24.95
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